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NOTES AND COMMENTS
passing. If, in view of the growth of large interstate corporations
and the basic structure of the American economy, a federal corpora-
tions law would be advantageous or desirable,4 then it is for Con-
gress to so provide.
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Torts-Implied Warranty-Privity
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions reject the require-
ment of privity of contract between the consumer of a product and
the manufacturer in an action on an implied warranty.' In Terry v.
Double Cola Bottling Co.,- North Carolina retained its rule requiring
privity. The court there affirmed a compulsory nonsuit in an action
against the manufacturer where the plaintiff's evidence showed
that she had purchased from a lunchroom, an intermediate seller,
a bottled drink allegedly containing a green fly.3 However, Justice
Sharp, in a thorough concurring opinion,4 attacked the food manu-
facturers' fortress of privity under the present North Carolina law
and urged the court to adopt the majority rule. This case presents
the question: is it necessary to abandon the privity requirement in
order to provide adequate remedies for an injured consumer or
ultimate user?
At common law, the courts required privity of contract in a
negligence action against the manufacturer.' However, when man-
ufacturers began making extensive use of distributors and retailers
to peddle their products to the public, the courts realized the in-
justice of this requirement.' The initial onslaught began in Mac-
"0 Some of the obvious advantages would be in the relative ease of obtain-
ing service of process, the jurisdictional requirements, and the most im-
portant would be that of uniformity. For the problems appendant to 10b-5
as a corporation law, and its effect on such things as the stock market, di-
rectors, etc., see Ruder, supra note 24.
'Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sonier), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Dean Prosser stated that no state has
adopted this privity requirement since 1935 but many have rejected it. Id. at
1110.
263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754.
'Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754. Justice Sharp concurred because she found
a lack of evidence that the fly was in the bottle when it left the defendant's
control.
'Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
' See generally Prosser, supra note 1.
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Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 7 where the court discarded the need
for privity in negligence actions and imposed a duty on manufac-
turers to make their product reasonably safe for all foreseeable
users.' This rule has been accepted by all jurisdictions' and has
been extended by some to protect bystanders "within the vicinity
of probable use."'"
Apart from negligence, the courts held the manufacturer liable
in contract."' Where the manufacturer made express representa-
tions to the public about the quality of his product,12 almost all
jurisdictions have held him strictly liable to the consumer or ulti-
mate user.'" In absence of express warranties, the courts held a
food manufacturer, packer, or processor liable to the consumer on
an implied warranty only if they were in privity of contract.14 But,
because of modern merchandizing and public policy, a distinct ma-
jority of the jurisdictions completely abrogated the privity require-
ment and held a food manufacturer strictly liable to the ultimate
consumer. 5 The courts extended this warranty to nonfood manu-
'217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8 For discussion of a manufacturer's negligence see Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of A Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816(1962). See generally 1 FRUMER & FRImEAN, PRoDucrs LIirBIIy §§ 5-15
(1964).
Prosser, supra note 1, at 1100.10E.g., Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954).
' See generally WILLISTON, SALES § 197 (1948).
12 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
(TV-"Nose, throat, and accessory organs not adversely affected by smok-
ing Chesterfields"); Maecherlin v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d
275, 302 P.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1956) (billboard--"Ten Year Warranty");
Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 272, 278 P.2d 723 (Ct.
App. 1955) (newspaper--"Boned Chicken"); Worley v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (label-"Kind to
Hands"); Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 339, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (magazine--"Will Not Shrink
or Stretch Out of Fit").
" Only three states appear to require privity in an action on an express
warranty: Barnard v. Pennsylvania Range Boiler Co., 216 F. Supp. 560
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (applying Massachusetts law) (water heater); Senter v.
B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954) (tire); Chanin v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937) (applying Illinois law)
(windshield glass).
"'E.g., Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 118 N.E. 853 (1918).
15 The jurisdictions of the following cases appear to require privity in
food cases for an action on an implied warranty: Birmingham Chero-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921) (fly in bottle); Nelson
v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (1905) (deleterious
canned tongue); but see Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark.
1964); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930)
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facturers,'8 and, again, a majority of the jurisdictions abolished
privity" and held the manufacturer strictly liable to foreseeable
users." As a final step in abolishing the entire privity concept,
some courts have held a manufacturer strictly liable in tort.' 9
(soda with arsenic); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925)(pin in bread); Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943)
(sausage with trichinosis); Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 263 Mass.
339, 161 N.E. 245 (1928) (glass in bottled milk); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942) (glass in coke); Thomason
v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935) (rat in sack of
flour); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Corp., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d
701 (1955) (deleterious apricot juice); Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67
S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940) (poisonous candy); Burgess v. Sanitary
Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939) (dictum). Some of the
theories utilized by the courts that have abrogated privity are: Williams v.
Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (rejected privity as
against public policy); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93
P.2d 799 (1939) (warranty from manufacturer to retailer inured to the
consumer's benefit); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176
N.W. 382 (1920) (manufacturer's marketing was a representation to the
public that the goods are merchantable) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons,
145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (warranty runs with the goods) ; Madouros
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445
(1936) (retailer assigned his warranty to the consumer) ; Cohen v. Dugan
Bros., 134 Misc. 155, 235 N.Y. Supp. 118 (1929) (privity evaded by im-
pleader); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557
(1928) (consumer was a third party beneficiary of the retailer's contract
with the manufacturer). See generally Gillam, Products Liability in A
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. Rzv. 119, 153-54 (1958).
"E.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
1' In addition to the jurisdictions in note 15 supra, the following juris-
dictions still appear to require privity in nonfood cases: Barlow v. DeVilbiss
Co., 214 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wisc. 1963) (defective container) ; Larson v.
United States Rubber Co., 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958) (rubber boots);
Jordan v. Worthington Pump & Mach. Co., 73 Ariz. 329, 241 P.2d 433
(1952) (pump); Behringer v. William Gretz Brewing Co., 53 Del. 365,
169 A.2d 249 (1961) (beer carton); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79
Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963) (ladder); Kennedy v. General Beauty Prods.,
112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E.2d 116 (1960) (hair dye); Odom v. Ford Motor
Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) (tractor lift); Kyker v. General
Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964) (defective auto engine).
"Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). The following are considered "foreseeable users:" Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962) (user-borrower); Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp.
409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (lessee); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp.
198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963) (repairman); and Jakubowski v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963) (employee).
However, the courts refuse to extend the benefit of this warranty to the
general public. Kuschy v. Norris, 206 A.2d 275 (Conn. 1964); Hahn-v.
Ford Motor Co., 126 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1964). But see Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra.
'" Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying
19651
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North Carolina accepts the majority rule in only two instances
-where the action is in negligence 0 and where a food manufac-
turer has made express warranties to the consumer. 21 As exempli-
fied by Terry, the court continues to require privity of contract in
an action against a manufacturer on an implied warranty.22 How-
ever, in cases involving sealed food stuffs, North Carolina has
allowed a defendant seller to join his seller; thus the manufacturer
may eventually be brought in as a party defendant.23
A manufacturer is primarily responsible for the quality of its
products; moreover, it is usually financially more able than inter-
mediate sellers to redress harmful effects caused by its products.
As has been indicated, the remedies available to an injured con-
sumer or ultimate user against a manufacturer are limited in North
Carolina. Thus the question: are they adequate?
In a negligence action, the consumer or ultimate user is aways
confronted with the difficulty of proof.2 4  When there is no direct
evidence of negligence, a majority of the courts allow him to resort
Texas law); Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963) (applying Louisiana law); and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). This view is embodied in
the Restatement of Torts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402 A (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
" E.g., Gwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302
(1960).
"In Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940),
the court held that the statement "Amox is made for the purpose of killing
insects, it is not poisonous to human beings" was an express warranty ap-
pearing on a can of insecticide. However, this express warranty exception
"has been limited to cases involving sale of goods, intended for human con-
sumption, in sealed packages prepared by the manufacturer and having
labels with representations to consumers inscribed thereto." Perfecting Serv.
Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 668, 136 S.E.2d 56, 62-63(1964).
22E.g., Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., supra note 21
(non-food); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30
(1935) (food).
" Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951). The opinion
emphasized that the distributor, a remote seller, was primarily liable. Id.
at 287, 63 S.E.2d at 826. Davis was limited by Perfecting Serv. Co. v.
Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 136 S.E.2d 56 (1964), where the
court emphasized "that it was not intended to abandon the privity rule in all
warranty cases, but the procedure approved therein was to apply only to
sale of articles for human consumption sold in sealed packages prepared by
the manufacturer." Id. at 670, 136 S.E.2d at 64.
' For discussion of the difficulties involved in proving negligence, see
Ashe, So You're Going to Try A Products Liability Case, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 66 (1961).
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to res ipsa loquitur.2 However, North Carolina rejects this doc-
trine in sealed food cases and requires the consumer to show "sim-
ilar instances,"2 6 an almost insurmountable task. In an action
on an express warranty, he has to show that the representations of
a food manufacturer do in fact constitute an express warranty.
28
Either because of lack of proof in negligence or lack of express
warranty, the consumer or ultimate user's only relief is an action
on an implied warranty. Because of the requirement of privity, he
cannot sue the manufacturer and is relegated to suing his immediate
seller, who may be equitably insolvent. Even under the joinder
procedure in sealed food cases, he is at the mercy of his immediate
seller and other interim sellers to join the manufacturer.2" In all
" 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 12.03 (1964).
"Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582
(1935). In non-food cases, it seems that the court does not require a show-
ing of "similar instances" but allows the use of res ipsa loquitur if the
injured user can show that the product was under the exclusive control of
the manufacturer. See Wyatt v. North Carolina Equipment Co., 253 N.C.
355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960).
"' Graham v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 188, 125 S.E.2d
429 (1962) (evidence that a bottle exploded without impact is not a similar
instance when the plaintiff's bottle exploded on a slight impact); McLeod
v. Lexington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 212 N.C. 671, 194 S.E. 82 (1937)
(evidence that two types of drinks bottled by the defendant contained foreign
substances was not a similar instance when the plaintiff's drink was of a
third type); Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180
S.E. 582 (1935) (evidence that other drinks bottled by the defendant con-
tained a "green looking thing," a dead fly, and a piece of glass was not a
similar instance when the plaintiff's bottle contained a mouse). But see
Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680 (1941)
(evidence that a plug of tobacco, a non-sealed product, contained a rat's
foot was sufficient to take the case to the jury even though the plaintiff's
plug contained a fish hook).
"A seller's representation about the quality of his product may be con-
sidered mere "puffing". Even though he may not specifically express him-
self in such words as "I promise you . . ." or "This product will not. . .," the
seller is constantly extolling his product as a "perfect product."
It is to shut one's eyes and ears in today's "world of advertising" to say
that, because no reassuring words appear on the product's container, the
manufacturer of a nationally advertised product has made no representa-
tion to the purchaser. He makes one every day-sometimes every hour
on the hour. Any [product] entitled to status as a "famous name brand"
has been warranted by the manufacturer to the consumer-very probably
in color !-in magazines, on billboards, and by "glamorous stars of stage
and screen" over radio and television.
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 13, 138 S.E.2d 753, 761
(Sharp, J., concurring). However, the court must find positive express war-
ranty. See Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367
(1963).
=° See Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
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other instances, the consequence is a multitude of litigation of
buyer against seller. Thus, in many cases, the requirement of
privity leaves an injured consumer or user without redress from the
manufacturer. Moreover, it could leave him without relief from
anyone.
An injured consumer or user who is not in fact the buyer
cannot sue the retailer on an implied warranty since there is no
privity. Therefore, neither a purchaser's husband, employee, or
guest can sue the retailer in absence of an agency relationship."0
Apart from cases where the retailer of the defective product is
known, the buyer may be unable to determine who was the seller
of the defective product when he has made identical purchases from
various retailers. Thus, in some cases, the privity requirement is an
absolute bar to redress from anyone in the absence of a negligence
action against the manufacturer.
The Uniform Commercial Code would provide limited relief.
It abandons the privity requirement to the extent that a buyer's
family, or member of his household, or guest can sue the last seller.81
However, since the Code has no vitality in the distributive chain,82
it does not change the existing case law in determining whether a
buyer or those named third party beneficiaries can directly sue the
manufacturer on an implied warranty. Since the North Carolina
case law requires privity, the Code would be useless in allowing a
"°In Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705 (1939), the con-
sumer's mother purchased a package of sausage containing a piece of metal.
Indicating that she purchased it for her son, the court held the retailer liable
but made no reference to the agency relation.
8 "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods . . . ." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
This provision was not adopted by California since their case law had al-
ready extended greater coverage than that provided by the Code. CAL.
Com. CODE § 2318, comment. Moreover, even though the legislature in
one state did adopt this provision, the court allowed a person not a named
third party beneficiary under this provision to sue the manufacturer on a
breach of an implied warranty. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120(E.D. Pa. 1961). Some courts have construed the word "family" to include
"industrial family." Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark.
1964). Contra, Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d
575 (1963).
"zUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3 (1962 Official Text
with Comments), provides that "the section is neutral and is not intended
to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's war-
ranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
tributive chain."
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suit against the manufacturer. Thus, privity must be abrogated
either by judicial decision or legislative enactment independent of
the Code.
The court in Terry could have easily adopted the majority rule
and eliminated privity without overruling any recent food case,33 or
it could have utilized a tort approach in holding the manufacturer
strictly liable to the consumer without impeaching the privity
requirement in warranty actions. 4 Moreover, it could have invoked
the majority rule35 that a violation of a pure food act36 is negligence
per se in a civil action.3? But the court refused to falter.
"8 It appears that the only food case expressly requiring privity was
Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). How-
ever, this rule has been stated countless times by nonfood cases citing
Thomason. The court keeps repeating their impregnable rule requiring
privity and defying its common law capacity.
[The majority rule] truly exemplified the capacity of the common law
to originate, modify, abandon, extend or adjust ideas, theories and rules to
meet changing conditions or achieve greater perfection in rendering
justice. Those who would freeze privity at any one stage of its develop-
ment are both ignoring its common-law origin as an imperfect idea in the
fallible human brains of certain judges-not a divine unchanging prin-
ciple in which there can be no error-and denying its common-law ca-
pacity to develop. The truth is that privity was never a static concept,
and it should not now be any more static than the common-law is
static ....
Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 104-05 (D. Hawaii 1961), aft'd, 304
F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
'In Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), the court
by dictum noted that a manufacturer's liability in sealed food cases was a
matter of "primary liability." Id. at 287, 63 S.E.2d at 826.
" Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 50 S.E.2d 136
(1948) (contaminated pie); Myer v. Greenwood, 125 Ind. App. 288, 124
N.E.2d 870 (1955) (trichinosis); Kelly v. J. R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63,
181 P. 326 (1919) (impure pig's feet); Alpine v. LaSalle Diners, 197 Misc.
415, 98 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1950) (wire in pie); Mahoney v. Shaker Square
Beverages, 46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951) (exploding bottle);
Tedder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 46, 77 S.E.2d 293 (1953) (glass
in coke). Contra, Walter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47
N.E.2d 739 (1943) (paint in milk is evidence of negligence); Gearing v.
Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916) (unwholesome pork chops
is some evidence of negligence); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690,
255 N.W. 414 (1934) (trichinosis is no evidence of negligence).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-120 to -145 (1960). The presence of a sub-
stance "natural" to the food is not an adulteration. Adams v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960) (crystallized corn in
corn flakes).
"' In Ward v. Morehead Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916),
the court imposed civil liability for a violation of this statute but did not
resolve the question of whether such a violation was negligence per se.
It seems that no decision since Ward has considered this question. However,
the court has held that a violation of a safety statute having force as law is
1965]
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The most effective remedy for an injured consumer and ulti-
mate user is usually an action against the manufacturer on an im-
plied warranty. Since the Code is inadequate and the court appar-
ently refuses to alter the case law, the legislature should expressly
abrogate privity to provide adequate protection to the public.38
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
negligence per se. Lutz Indus. Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332,
88 S.E.2d 333 (1955) (North Carolina Building Code). There, the court
said "it is well settled law in this jurisdiction, that when a statute imposes
upon a person a specific duty for the protection of others, that a violation
of such statute is negligence per se." Id. at 341, 88 S.E.2d at 339.
" Virginia has enacted such a statute.
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in
any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to re-
cover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negli-
gence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the de-
fendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller
might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964). A bill that would partially abrogate
the privity requirement had been introduced into the North Carolina General
Assembly, H.B. 251, 1965 Sess., but was killed in committee. News and Ob-
server, April 23, 1965, p. 12, col. 1.
[Vol. 43
